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Forum Shopping in European Insurance
Litigation: A Comparison -Between
Jurisdictional Rules in the European
Union and the United States
KING FUNG TSANG
International forum shopping is hardly a new topic.' As long
as the jurisdictional rules of different countries are different,
litigants (in most cases, plaintiffs) will likely try to take advantage
of more favorable forums when bringing a lawsuit. It is the same in
both Europe and in the United States. However, since the
European Union's ("EU") 1968 Convention on Jurisdiction and
the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters
(the "Brussels Convention"),2 different conflict of laws rules
among EU member states. have harmonized. Currently, Council
Regulation (EC) 44/2001 (the "Judgment Regulation") supersedes
the Brussels Convention. One of the desirable effects of the
Judgment Regulation is that it eliminates forum shopping by
standardizing the way that a court in a member state can acquire
jurisdiction.3 While this intended goal is arguably a success in
* Associate, Shearman & Sterling, LLP; J.D., Columbia University School of Law, 2010;
LL.M., Columbia University School of Law, 2006; LL.M., University College London,
2002; LL.B., The University of Hong Kong, 2000.
1. For a general introduction, see Ralph U. Whitten, U.S. Conflict-of-Laws Doctrine
and Forum Shopping, International and Domestic (Revisited), 37 TEX. INT'L L.J. 559
(2002); see also Emil Petrossian, In Pursuit of the Perfect Forum: Transnational Forum
Shopping in the United States and England, 40 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1257 (2007).
2. Report on the Convention on the Association of the Kingdom of Denmark,
Ireland and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the Convention
on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters and
to the Protocol on its Interpretation by the Court of Justice, 7 136, 1979 O.J. (C 59) 71, 112
[hereinafter Schlosser Report].
3. Council Regulation 44/2001, On Jurisdiction and the Recognition and
Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, 69-89 , O.J. (L 012) 1
(EC).
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general, the same may not be said in relation to litigation involving
the insurance industry, which falls under a special regulatory
regime of the Judgment Regulation.4 On the other hand, the
United States has always played a big part in both the insurance
industry and international forum shopping discussions. The United
States has been the darling for international litigation for years
because of its broad jurisdictional and favorable procedural rules.
.An analysis of the interactions between these two systems, in
terms of insurance litigation, raises interesting issues in both
general international litigation and forum shopping in insurance
litigation. In particular, this article is an attempt to highlight
certain ways that a European policyholder can gain sometimes
unjustified advantages over a U.S. insurance company. The EU
hoped it would be able to negate any unjustified advantages
against insurance companies while preserving a legitimate goal of
protecting underprivileged litigants involved in lawsuits with an
insurance company. In this article, each major jurisdictional rule
on the Judgment Regulation's insurance matters will be compared
with its U.S. counterpart. Part I introduces New Hampshire
Insurance Company v. Strabag Bau A. G. (the "New Hampshire
case"), a case decided in 1991 by an English court of appeal.! Part
II gives a brief description of the Judgment Regulation and
compares its special jurisdictional rules governing insurance
matters with those of the U.S. Part III introduces the U.S.
jurisdictional rules and their application to the New Hampshire
case. Part IV criticizes the unsatisfactory aspects of the Judgment
Regulation. Finally, Part V proposes certain measures that might
alleviate the various issues.
I. THE NEW HAMPSHIRE CASE
The defendants in the New Hampshire case, Strabag Bau A.
G. and Bilfinger and Berger A.G., both German companies, and
Universale Hoch and Tief Bauaktiengesellschaft, an Austrian
company (together, the "Construction Companies''), formed a
joint venture and entered into a contract for the construction of
6Basrah International Airport in Iraq. In 1981, the Construction
4. Id.
5. New Hampshire Ins. Co. v. Strabag Bau A.G., [19921 1 Lloyd's Rep. 361 (U.K.).
6. Id. at 361.
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Companies took out an insurance policy through their brokers in
London ("London Brokers") against certain risks associated with
the project.. Their brokers placed this insurance policy in
accordance with the usual practices of the London market. The
leading underwriter was the New Hampshire Insurance Co. ("New
Hampshire"), a U.S. insurance company, which was represented
by American Inter-national Underwriters (UK) Ltd. in London.
Although insurance companies from Germany, Sweden, Italy,
France, and the U.S. were placed at risk, the bulk of the risk was
placed on United Kingdom insurers (together, the "Insurers").
The Construction Companies' London Brokers prepared the
wording of the policy. The policy did not include governing law or
jurisdictional clauses. In 1989, the Construction Companies filed a
series of large claims between £20 million and 160 million based on
corrosion damage to the foundations'of the airport building. The
Insurers responded by issuing proceedings in London, seeking a
declaration that they had avoided the policy on the basis of the
Construction Companies' non-disclosure. The key issue in that
case was whether the English Court had jurisdiction over the
Construction Companies. The Court held that the English courts
did not have jurisdiction over the Construction Com anies under
the Judgment Regulation.9 The Plaintiffs appealed. Lloyd L.J.,
who delivered the judgment for the Court of Appeal, upheld the
lower Court's decision."
Before going through the reasoning behind the decision, it
may be helpful to highlight certain key factors of the case. First,
the insurance transaction had the most natural connection with
London because the negotiation and conclusion of the policy took
place in London, the London insurance companies shouldered the
bulk of the risks, and the Construction Companies were
represented by London Brokers. 12
Second, there were few connections to other jurisdictions.
The Construction Companies' only relevant connection to
Germany is that they were domiciled there," and their only
7. Id. at 364.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 362.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 370.
12. See id. at 364.
13. Id. at 361.
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connection to the U.S. is that their underwriter was domiciled
there, though the underwriter acted through its representative in
London for the transaction.14 Even though Iraq may have certain
connections to the case because it was the place where the damage
was claimed to have happened," this was not discussed in the
judgment.
Third, although the insurance policy did not include a
governing law clause and the Court did not decide this question,
the insurance policy was likely to be governed by English law
under the EU's choice of law rules, given its connections with
London.
Fourth, the Construction Companies are sophisticated
corporations. According to the judgment, the Construction
Companies are substantial civil engineering and construction
businesses. While there is no information regarding their actual
size at the time, it is reasonable to assume that they are rather
large corporations. For example, Strabag is currently the fifth
largest construction company in Europe." In 2008, Strabag had
approximately 73,000 employees and posted an output volume of
around E13.7 billion.17 The Construction Companies' London
brokers prepared the wording of the policy and initiated it." The
Insurers referred to the Construction Companies as having
equivalent or comparable bargaining power, a conclusion that the
Court did not dispute.
Fifth, the cross-border infrastructure project is the
construction of the largest airport in Iraq at the time, and is still
the second largest airport in Iraq to date.20 In addition, the claims
14. Id. at 364.
15. Id. at 361.
16. Christian Gutlederer, Russian billionaire to buy $1.6 bln Strabag stake, REUTERS
UK, April 25, 2007, http://uk.reuters.com/articlePrint?articleld=UKL2554179020070425.
17. Strabag,
http://www.strabag.com/databases/internet/_public/content.nsf/Navigation?OpenAgent&d
ocid=79E200B4108F278FC125736A0046758E (last visited Feb. 2, 2010).
18. New Hampshire Ins. Co. v. Strabag Bau A.G., [1992] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 361, 364
(U.K.).
19. Id.
20. Patrick Hinton, British Troops Leave Basra Airport, SUITE10l.COM, Jan. 6, 2009,
http://britishaffairs.suite101.com/article.cfm/british-troops-1eave-basra-airport.
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involved here are huge. £20 million to £60 million in 1989 is worth
roughly £50 million to f150 million today.2 1 *
With these factors in mind, the New Hampshire case raised
several important issues: (1) why did the English Court hold that
it had no jurisdiction when England was the jurisdiction that had
the closest connections with the transaction?; (2) if the English
courts did not have jurisdiction, which courts should have had
jurisdiction?; (3) is there anything the Plaintiffs could have done,
differently to avoid this result?; (4) would the case be decided
differently if similar litigation arose in the U.S.? These issues will
be discussed after the major jurisdictional rules under the
Judgment Regulation are explained in Part II.
II. THE JUDGMENT REGULATION
The Judgment Regulation applies to every member state of
the EU, except Denmark.2 2 It generally applies to civil and
commercial matters involving a defendant domiciled in a member
state.23 The Judgment Regulation brought a substantial change to
the London insurance market, which is one of the leading
insurance markets in the world. When the United Kingdom
acceded to the Judgment Regulation, special consideration was
given to the London insurance market.24 One of the United
Kingdom's requests was to exclude powerful multi-national
corporations from the protections afforded to policyholders in
general.25 However, as explained below, this attempt was not
overly successful. The relevant jurisdiction rules on insurance are
set forth in Section 3 of the Judgment Regulation.
21. See Measuring Worth, Five Ways to Compute the Relative Value of a UK Pound
Amount, 1830 to Present, http://www.measuringworth.com/ukcompare (last visited Feb. 2,
2010).
22. Europa - Summaries of EU Legislation, Jurisdiction, recognition and enforcement
of judgments in civil and commercial matters ("Brussels I"),
http://europa.eu/legislation-summaries/justice-freedomsecurity/judicial cooperation in_
civil-matters/133054_en.htm.
23. See Council Regulation 44/2001, supra note 3, art. 2.
24. Report on the Convention on the Association- of the Kingdom of Denmark,
Ireland and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the Convention
on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters and
to the Protocol on its Interpretation by the Court of Justice, [ 136, 1979 O.J. (C 59) 71, 112
[hereinafter Schlosser Report].
25. Id.
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A. Article 9(1) -Domicile
The most fundamental basis for jurisdiction *under the
Judgment Regulation is domicile. Under Article 2 of the Judgment
Regulation, persons domiciled in a member state must be sued in
the courts of that member state.26 The central theme of Article 2 is
that a court's location is the natural forum because it is where the
defendant is domiciled, and thus the most reasonable forum in
which a plaintiff can sue the defendant. 27 The insurance regime for
insurance related matters also follows this general rule in Article
9(1)(a) of the Judgment Regulation, which allows an insurer
domiciled in a member state to be sued in the courts of that
28member state. However, in an attempt to protect the
policyholder, the insured, and the beneficiary, Article 9(1)(b)
further allows parties to bring suits against insurers in the courts of
the member state where these parties are domiciled. 29 This greatly
expanded the possible fora in which an insurance company could
be sued, even if the insurance transaction at issue may have had
few connections with the particular jurisdiction. On the other
hand, the only jurisdiction in which an insurance company can sue
a policyholder, the insured, or the beneficiary remains in its
respective home jurisdiction.30 Thus, applying these rules in the
New Hampshire case, the Court of Appeal found that the Insurers
could not sue the Construction Companies in England because the
Construction Companies were domiciled in Germany.3 1 If the
Insurers sued the Construction Companies in a EU member state,
the only possible forum would be the German courts.
What if the Construction Companies brought the proceedings
against the Insurers for non-payment instead? The Construction
Companies would definitely be able to sue the Insurers in
England, the place where the Insurers bearing the bulk of the risks
are domiciled. The Insurers domiciled in other member states
could possibly be joined under the joinder rules of the Judgment
26. Council Regulation 44/2001, supra note 3, art. 2.
27. Id.
28. Id. art. 9(l)(a).
29. Id. art. 9(l)(b).
30. Id. art. 12(1). This is subject to counterclaims under Article 12(2) and, in
exceptional cases in certain direct actions, under Article 11(3).
31. See New Hampshire Ins. Co. v. Strabag Bau A.G., [1992] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 361, 370
(U.K.).
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Regulation.32 Alternatively, the Construction Companies could sue
each party separately in the courts of the member states where
they are domiciled.33 In addition, as policyholders, the
Construction Companies could choose to bring the suit in
Germany where they reside, pursuant to Article 9(1)(b).3 4 Thus,
within the EU, the Construction Companies could shop between
England and Germany. These rules are mandatory and, once the
Construction Companies make their forum choice, there is nothing
the Insurers can do to change it.
Table I summarizes the application of the Judgment
Regulation in the New Hampshire case:
Table 1- Jurisdictional Analysis of the New Hampshire Case
Plaintiff Insurers suing Construction
Court with Construction Companies suing
Jurisdiction Companies Insurers
England A B
x X
Germany C D.4 .4
New York E F
x X*
* In theory, the ' Construction Companies could sue the
Insurers in New York. However, it is likely that the New York
court will decline jurisdiction on the ground of forum non
.35conveniens."
32. See id. art. 9(1)(c) (providing an insurer domiciled in a member state may be sued
if he is a co-insurer in the courts of a member state where proceedings are brought against
the leading insurer). In the New Hampshire case, while the leading insurer is New
Hampshire Insurance Co., a U.S. company, the fact that it was represented by an English
company caused it to be deemed domiciled in England, according to Article 9(2), making
Article 9(1)(c) applicable.
33. See Schlosser Report, supra note 24, 1 149.
34. See Council Regulation 44/2001, supra note 3, art. 9(1)(b).
35. See, e.g., Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 255 (1981) (finding that
dismissal of a case on the basis of forum non conveniens may occur even where law in the
alternative forum is unfavorable).
2452010]
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B. Article 9(2) - Expansion of the Domicile Rule
As a U.S. insurer, New Hampshire is not domiciled in any
member state under the Judgment Regulation. Why then should it
be subject to the jurisdiction chosen by the Construction
Companies? The New Hampshire case did not analyze this point
explicitly." However, New Hampshire is bound by the Judgment
Regulation because the basic domicile rule under Article 9(1) is
expanded by Article 9(2), which provides that an insurance
company is deemed to be domiciled in a member state if it has a
branch, agency, or other establishment in one of the member
states and the dispute arises out of such a branch, agency, or other
establishment.3 ' Accordingly, because New Hampshire was
represented by its London representative in this transaction, it
31would be deemed domiciled in England on the basis of agency.
The New Hampshire case does not note, however, that there
would. have been a difference in the case if the representation
39involved an agency or if New Hampshire had participated in the
transaction directly. In Group Josi Reinsurance Company S.A. v.
Universal General Insurance Company, the European Court of
Justice held that the Judgment Regulation applied beyond solely
the intra-Europe situation because Article 2 did not impose any
limits.40 In other words, Article 2 (or Article 9(1) in the insurance
cases) applies not only when a EU party sues another EU party,
but also when a non-European party sues a European party. If
New Hampshire was not deemed domiciled in England, a
difference would only arise if the Construction Companies sued
New Hampshire. In that case, the Judgment Regulation would not
have applied at all.41 Instead, the Construction Companies would
36. The New Hampshire case addressed a suit by the Insurers against the
Construction Companies, so the court of appeals did not need to analyze a dispute
brought by the Construction Companies against the Insurers.
37. Council Regulation 44/2001, supra note 3, arts. 9(1) - 9(2).
38. It is possible for a foreign insurance company to be deemed domiciled in more
than one member state. For example, a U.S insurance company with branches in London,
Paris, and Geneva will be deemed to be domiciled in England, France, and Switzerland.
39. The judgment did not describe in detail the nature of the representation. If the
representative is in fact an independent broker, such representation will not constitute a
branch, agency, or other establishment under Article 9(2).
40. See Case C-412/98, Group Josi Reinsurance Co. S.A. v. Universal Gen. Ins. Co.,
2000 E.C.R. 1-5925, 1-5937; see also Jordan Grand Prix Ltd. v Baltic Ins. Group, [1999] 2
A.C. 127, 133. (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.) (U.K.).
41. See Council Regulation 44/2001, supra note 3, art. 2.
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have needed to rely on the specific jurisdictional rules of the
relevant jurisdiction in which they filed suit. For example, if the
Construction Companies had filed suit against New Hampshire in
Germany, assuming New Hampshire was domiciled in the U.S.,
there would have to be a valid basis under the jurisdictional rules
of Germany apart from the rules of the Judgment Regulation. In
any event, to the extent that a policyholder domiciled in the EU is
involved in litigation with the insurer, the policyholder will have
plenty of options and motivation to engage in forum shopping.
C. Is There Anything the Insurers Could Have Done
Differently?
The combined effect of the above rules under the Judgment
Regulation is ultimately unsatisfactory. After all, the only
connection with Germany is the domicile of the Construction
Companies, whereas the connections with London are
overwhelming. Why were the rules designed that way in the first
place? The purpose of the entire insurance section of the
Judgment Regulation is to protect the policyholder, insured, and
42beneficiary, who are usually the weaker parties. These parties
are, therefore, given both a shield and a sword. They can only be
sued in their home jurisdiction, but they can sue others in multiple
fora.
However, the Construction Companies at issue here are all
large corporations that do not appear to deserve this protection. In
the New Hampshire case, this is challenged by the Insurers'
counsel. 43 Lloyd L.J., who delivered the judgment of the Court of
Appeal, rejected this argument and referred, inter alia, to the
drafting report of the Brussels Convention, which stated that the
member states failed to find a "suitable demarcation line" to limit
the application of Section 3.44 Lloyd L.J., not surprisingly, rejected
the request of the Insurers' counsel to rectify that failure by
limiting the application to private parties.4 ' The request to refer the
question to the European Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling
42. Id. art. 13(2). New Hampshire Ins. Co. v. Strabag Bau A.G., [1992] 1 Lloyd's
Rep. 361, 367 (U.K.).
43. See id. at 367-69.
44. Id. at 367.
45. Id. at 369.
.2010] 247
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was rejected because the Court of Appeal considered the answers
to be "straightforward ... [and] involve no great difficulty."46
Subsequent to this case, the European Court of Justice had an
opportunity to revisit this issue in Universal General Insurance
Company v. Group Josi Reinsurance Company S.A.47 In that case,
the European Court of Justice faced the issue of whether a
contract between an insurance company and a reinsurance
company falls within the regime of Section 3, possibly qualifying as
an insurance matter under the Judgment Regulation. 8 The
European Court of Justice held that reinsurance matters were not
to be recognized as insurance matters. Instead, reinsurance matters
are between professional insurance parties who do not need the
protection of the Judgment Regulation.49
In 2004, the European Court of Justice affirmed this view
again in Groupement d/intiret 9conomique (GIE) R6union
europdenne v. Zurich Espaha when it presided over the issue of
whether a dispute between two insurance companies falls within
the regime of the insurance provisions of the Judgment
Regulation.so GIE held that the provisions are not applicable due
to the professional knowledge of the parties.' In particular, the
European Court of Justice quoted the following in both cases:
According to settled case-law, it is apparent ... that, in
affording the insured a wider range of jurisdiction than that
available to the insurer and in excluding any possibility of a
clause conferring jurisdiction for the benefit of the insurer, they
reflect an underlying concern to protect the insured, who in
most cases is faced with a predetermined contract the clauses. of
which are no longer negotiable and is the weaker party
economically.12
On this basis, it seems that the argument of the Insurers'
counsel may be persuasive. After all, the Construction Companies
are all large corporations with substantial bargaining power. The
46. Id. at 372.
47. Case C-412/98, Group Josi Reinsurance Co. S.A. v. Universal Gen. Ins. Co., 2000
E.C.R. 1-5925.
48. Id. at 1-05958.
49. Id. at 1-05959.
50. Case C-77/04, Groupement d/int6rdt 6conomique (GIE) Rdunion europ6enne v.
Zurich Espafia, 2005 E.C.R. 1-4509, 1-4531.
51. Id. at 1-4530.
52. Id. at 1-4529. See also Group Josi Reinsurance, 2000 E.C.R. at 1-5959.
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insurance policy's clauses are not predetermined by the Insurers
either. Like the insurance company and reinsurance company, it
seems equally unreasonable to protect the Insurers, despite not
being "professional in the insurance sector"" per se. However, it is
unlikely that the European Court of Justice will rule differently
from the Court of Appeal. In the above cases, the European Court
of Justice continued to approve previous cases that involved
sophisticated policyholders. In fact, the paragraph cited above is
from Gerling v. Amministrazione del Tesoro dello Stato, where the
policyholder was also a rather powerful party, Italy's Ministry of
Finance.54 Accordingly, it appears that the holdings in UGIC and
GIE are limited to professional insurance parties, while the
sophisticated policyholders will continue to be protected by the
Judgment Regulation. The only attempt of the Judgment
Regulation to exclude the applicability of Section 3 from
undeserving parties is the exclusion of certain types of "large
risks" insurance that will be discussed in more details below.
D. Article 13(5) and Article 14 - Jurisdiction Clause
In hindsight, what other measures could the Insurers have
taken in order to avoid this absurd result? An obvious choice
would be to include a jurisdiction clause in the insurance policy.
However, a jurisdiction clause would not help the Insurers in this
case. According to the Judgment Regulation, an insurance policy's
jurisdiction clause is only given effect against a policyholder,
insured, or beneficiary, where at least one of the following applies:
(1) the agreement is entered into by the parties
subsequent to the dispute;"
(2) the policyholder and insurer are both domiciled or
habitual residents in the same member state when
the agreement was entered into;"
(3) the agreement allows the policyholder, insured, or
beneficiary to bring proceedings in courts other than
those indicated in Section 3;"
53. GIE Rgunion europdenne, 2005 E.C.R. at 1-4530; Group Josi Reinsurance, 2000
E.C.R. at 1-5959.
54. Gerling Konzern Speziale Kreditversicherung AG v. Amministrazione del Tesoro
dello Stato, 1983 E.C.R. 2503, [1984] 3 C.M.L.R. 638, 643.
55. Council Regulation 44/2001, supra note 3, art. 13(1).
56. Id. art. 13(3).
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(4) the policyholder who entered into the insurance
policy is not domiciled in any member state."
(5) The agreement relates to insurance involving the
loss of or damage to ships, aircraft, or cargos,59 and
all large risks as defined in Council Directive
73/239/EEC.o If the insurance policy falls into the
"large risks" insurance exception as mentioned
above, the parties could opt out of the mandatory
jurisdictional rules.
The most relevant exception appears to be the one dealing
with large risks. Most of the large risks, as defined by the Council
Directive, are risks in relation to traditional commercial insurance,
such as loss of or damage to ships, aircrafts, or cargos, motor
vehicle liability, fire and natural forces, and general insurance."
The, only large risk that is relevant to our discussion is the one
relating to "miscellaneous financial loss," which is defined as
"employment risks, insufficiency of income (general), bad
weather, loss of benefits, continuing general expenses, unforeseen
trading expenses, loss of market value, loss of rent or revenue,
indirect trading losses other than those mentioned above, other
financial loss (non-trading), and other forms of financial loss."62 If
the relevant insurance falls into one of the aforementioned items
in the miscellaneous financial loss category, a jurisdiction
agreement will be effective against a policyholder, where the
policyholder exceeds the limits of at least two of the following
three criteria:
(1) balance-sheet total = ECU$6.2 million;
(2) net turnover = ECU$12.8 million;
(3) average number of employees during the financial
Year = 250.63
57. Id. art. 13(2).
58. Id. art. 13(4). However, this rule does not apply if the insurance policy involved is
compulsory or relates to immovable property in a member state. See id.
59. Id. art. 13(5).
60. Id. art. 13(5), 14. See also Charman v. WOC Offshore BV [1993] 2 Lloyd's Rep
551, 558 (U.K.) (narrowing the scope further by holding that the jurisdiction agreement
must be related to one of the specified risks listed in Article 14 and no others or else it will
be deemed ineffective).
61. Council Directive 73/239/EEC, Annex A, 1973 O.J. (L 228) 1, 1-17 (EC).
62. Id. Annex A, at 16.
63. See id
[Vol. 32:239250
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There are three problems with this exception. First, the
Council Directives have not defined financial loss and the
Euro ean Court of Justice did not clarify the meaning of the
term. 4 Although the Council Directives were all passed before the
New Hampshire case, the English Court of Appeal did not refer to
any relevant articles in the Judgment Regulation.6 ' This may be
because the insurance policy lacks a jurisdiction clause. However,
given the extensive discussions in the case on whether large
corporations should be covered by the protections of the Judgment
Regulation,6 6 the exception is highly relevant and its omission
seems rather unusual. Perhaps its uncertain meaning is the reason.
Not coincidentally, leading hornbooks on the Judgment
Regulation, including Dicey, Morris, and Collins and Brussels I
Regulations, do not have any specific discussion on its meaning.
Furthermore, general linguistic assumptions do not seem to be
helpful in its interpretation. For instance, if we apply the ejusdem
generis ("of the same kind") rule, it is'difficult to determine from
the specific items listed above the "other financial loss" bullet
point what general kinds of financial risks are covered. In short,
financial loss is one of the terms in the Judgment Regulation that
does not appear to have any real impact in practice. Given the
highly favorable stand taken by the European Court of Justice
over the policyholders, it is likely that the courts will construe
financial loss narrowly, limiting it to the types of financial loss that
are specifically listed.
Second, even if financial loss covered the insurance policy in
the New Hanipshire case, the exception only applies to large
companies. For example, a company would have easily qualified
for listing on the Frankfurt Stock Exchange, one of the largest
stock exchanges in Europe, which currently only requires a
minimum market capitalization of E1.25 million," if it passed the
financial criteria above. Third, the problems of how a court will
treat small subsidiaries of large conglomerates and whether a court
64. See id.
65. See New Hampshire Ins. Co. v. Strabag Bau A.G., [1992] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 361
(U.K.).
66. Id. at 365-70.
67. Deutsche Bbrse Group, Rules and Regs, http://deutsche-
boerse.com/dbag/dispatchlen/notescontent/gdb-navigation/listing/20_Going-Publ.ic/05_Re
gularien/INTEGRATE/zpd?notesDoc=KIR+LCGPRegularien&expandview.
2010]1 25-1
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will pierce the corporate veil if an individual subsidiary does not
exceed the financial criteria arise.
With these rules in mind, if the New Hampshire case had a
jurisdiction clause in the insurance policy that granted exclusive
jurisdiction to the English courts, it is unlikely that it would have
been given effect against the policyholders because such a clause is
not entered into subsequent to the dispute. Furthermore, the
clause would not have given any new jurisdiction option to the
Construction Companies, and it is unlikely that it would fall within
the large risks exception. However, a jurisdiction clause will always
be effective against the Insurers.
E. Article 1(2) (d) -Arbitration Clause
In the end, the only certain way that the Insurers could have
effectively prevented litigating their disputes in an undesirable
forum is by including an arbitration clause in the insurance policy.
If the insurance policy had an arbitration clause, the case would be
outside the scope of the Judgment Regulation.69 However, an
arbitration clause must be clear and unambiguous. For example,
the insurance policy in the New Hampshire case contains an
arbitration clause, but the clause only refers disputes to arbitration
when disputes involve the quantum of the compensation, rather
than the validity of the liabilities."o More importantly, while an
arbitration clause could mitigate the problem, it is not a perfect
solution. An arbitration clause could help because it is outside of
the Judgment Regulation's scope, but is conversely limited for that
same reason. In order to fully understand this statement, we must
observe what would happen if an insurance policy includes an
arbitration clause.
With the Judgment Regulation out of the picture, the national
law of the member states, including their traditional conflict of
laws rules, governs all issues concerning the arbitration agreement.
This includes the governing law, the arbitration process, the
appointment of arbitrators, and, most- importantly, the
enforcement of the arbitral awards. Apparently, with so many
different countries in the EU, the result of the arbitration depends
68. See Council Regulation 44/2001, supra note 3, art. 13(2).
69. See id. art. 1(2)(d).
70. New Hampshire Ins. Co., [1992] 1 Lloyd's Rep. at 365.
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on the designated locationof the arbitration and the governing law
the parties agreed upon in the insurance policy. Thus, insurance
companies should bargain for a favorable arbitration location with
favorable governing law to the transaction. This is easier said than
done. When dealing with sophisticated policyholders that have
equal bargaining power, an agreement to arbitrate may not even
be reached, let alone conceded to upon favorable arbitration
terms. If the policyholders are not sophisticated, the validity of the
arbitration agreement could be challenged under the respective
national contract laws on grounds of unconscionability or public
policy. Even if we assume that the insurance companies could
obtain favorable arbitration terms, such as arbitration in London
under English law, the biggest hurdle remains the enforcement of
the arbitral awards.
Most of the EU's member states are signatories to the New
York Convention, an international treaty that promotes judgment
enforcement among signatories.1  Under the New York
Convention, when the Insurers receive arbitral.awards in London
under English law, the arbitral awards must be enforced or
recognized in the home jurisdiction of the Construction
Companies, assuming they have no operations or assets in the
United Kingdom. Article III of the New York Convention
provides that "there shall -not be imposed substantially more
onerous conditions or higher fees or charges on the recognition or
enforcement of arbitral awards to which this Convention applies
than are imposed on the recognition or enforcement of domestic
arbitral awards."72 Accordingly, the difficulty of enforcing arbitral
awards depend on the standard measures each member state has
in enforcing their domestic arbitral awards, including any inherent
defenses that are available to the policyholders in order to
challenge the awards.
Comparatively, the situation would be very different if the
Judgment Regulation applied. Apart from harmonizing
jurisdictional rules, the Judgment Regulation streamlines the
enforcement mechanism among member states. Once a judgment
is issued in the court of a member state within the scope of the
71. For parties to the Convention, see Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, adopted June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, Part 3, 330
U.N.T.S. 38, 2 (hereinafter New York Convention].
72. New York Convention, supra note 71, 21 U.S.T. at Part 1, 330 U.N.T.S. at 3.
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Judgment Regulation, the judgment is given the "same force and
effect as a judgment of the court in which it is registered, and
proceedings for or with respect to its enforcement may be taken,
as if the judgment had been originally given by the registering
court."" This resembles the notion of full faith and credit practiced
by U.S. courts, and the judgment is subject to very few challenges.
Apparently, if insurance companies are not subject to more
unfavorable treatment under the Judgment Regulation, the
uniform and easy judgment enforcement mechanism under the
Judgment Regulation would be preferred over arbitration under
the New York Convention. However, the current rules only mean
that the insurance companies will face an efficient enforcement
system should they fail to insert an arbitration clause and, as a
result, may have an unfavorable judgment entered against them in
court.
In short, a standard arbitration clause requiring arbitration in
London under English law will never be a one-size-fits-all solution.
Given the current rules, however, it would be the best available
measure in order to defend the interests of the insurance
companies.
F Other Jurisdictional Bases
In addition to the above rules, which allow the courts to
derive general jurisdiction over the insurance companies, the
Judgment Regulation provides for other bases of jurisdiction. With
liability insurance, for example, insurance against legal liability to
third parties and insurance of immovable property, the insurance
company may be sued where the harmful event occurred." The
courts will also have jurisdiction in a third party claim that is
brought by an injured party against the insured, where the insurer
asks to be joined." Articles 11(2) and 11(3) also allow, to a limited
extent, the injured parties to bring direct proceedings against
.76insurers.
73. DICEY, MORRIS & COLLINS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 650 (Lawrence Collins
ed., 14th ed. 2006).
74. See Council Regulation 44/2001, supra note 3, art. 10(2).
75. Id. art. 11(1).
76. For a detailed discussion on the direct actions, see DICEY, MORRIS & COLLINS
ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS, supra note 73, at 435.
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III. THE UNITED STATES JURISDICrION RULES
Would the U.S. courts have jurisdiction in the New
Hampshire case? As neither party in the case initiated proceedings
in the U.S., we will analyze that scenario based on the general
jurisdictional rules in the U.S.
Since International Shoe Co. v. Washington, the U.S. Supreme
Court has laid down "minimum contacts" as the basic
jurisdictional test in the U.S. In International Shoe, the Supreme
Court held that a state could exercise personal jurisdiction over a
defendant if the defendant had minimum contacts with the state
and it was fair for the defendant to defend the lawsuit there."
However, the Supreme Court did not clearly define what
constitutes minimum contacts. Instead, the Supreme Court noted
that minimum contacts depends on the "nature and quality" of the
contacts with the state. 8 Accordingly, unlike the Judgment
Regulation, there is no hard and fast rule for U.S. courts.
Commentators generally divide personal jurisdiction into two
broad categories: specific jurisdiction and general jurisdiction.79
Specific jurisdiction refers to jurisdiction over claims arising out of
acts specific to the dispute. In order for specific jurisdiction to be
established, the contacts must be related to the dispute." In other
words, the same contacts might not be sufficient in an unrelated
dispute in the same state. General jurisdiction, on the other hand,
refers to jurisdiction founded upon a basis independent from the
nature of the dispute between the parties.82 General jurisdiction
can be established even if the contacts in question do not relate to
the dispute, as long as such in-state contacts are very substantial.83
The Supreme Court further elaborates on specific jurisdiction
in McGee v. International Insurance, the "grandfather of Supreme
Court jurisdictional opinions in contract cases,"84 which also
happens to be an insurance case." In McGee, a California resident
purchased a life insurance policy from an Arizona insurance
77. Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 326 (1945).
78. Id. at 319.
79. EUGENE F. SCOLES ET AL., CONFLICT OF LAWS 300 (3d ed. 2000).
80. Id. at 299.
81. Id. at 300.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 310.
84. Id. at 380.
85. McGee v. Int'l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
2010] 255
256 Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. [Vol. 32:239
company. Subsequently, the defendant, a Texas insurer, purchased
the insurance policy from the Arizona insurer and then solicited
the policyholder to renew the policy under the original terms."
After the policyholder died, the defendant denied liability on the
basis that the policyholder committed suicide and, therefore, was
barred from compensation." The beneficiary then brought an
action against the defendant in California." The Supreme Court
held that the defendant had minimum contacts in California, even
though the defendant did not have agents or offices in California.8 9
Accordingly, even if the defendant only solicits one transaction in
California, this is sufficient to establish specific jurisdiction.
Applying these basic jurisdiction rules to the New Hampshire
case, the Insurers would not be able to sue the Construction
Companies in the U.S. The English court did not refer to the
domicile of New Hampshire in the New Hampshire case, but we
will assume that its domicile is New York for the sake of
discussion. The Construction Companies, assuming they had no
substantial operations in the U.S., cannot be subject to any U.S.
court on the basis of either specific or general jurisdiction (see Box
E in Table 1). However, if the Construction Companies filed a suit
against New Hampshire in New York, there may be a chance that
the Construction Companies could succeed in establishing
jurisdiction based on general jurisdiction because their
headquarters are located there (see Box F in Table 1). While there
may be a jurisdictional basis for the Construction Companies to
bring a suit in New York, the New York courts would probably not
exercise jurisdiction due to the forum non conveniens doctrine.
A. Forum Non Conveniens Doctrine
Under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, U.S. courts may
exercise discretion when deciding whether or not to decline
jurisdiction on the ground that there exists a more appropriate
forum.90 Although the doctrine is discretionary, its application is
far from arbitrary. The court must review all relevant factors,
including the plaintiff's preference, the availability of witnesses
86. Id. at 221.
87. Id. at 222.
88. Id at 221.
89. Id. at 222-23.
90. SCOLES ET AL., supra note 79, at 479-80.
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and evidence, the litigation costs, the administrative difficulties of
the court, and the governing law, just to name a few.9' When
applying this doctrine to the New Hampshire case, it is obvious
that England is the more appropriate forum because it has the
most connections with the transaction and it is available to the
Construction Companies. Moreover, English judges have
substantial experience and expertise in adjudicating insurance
cases, especially with respect to insurance policies that are drafted
in accordance with the practices of the London market, and thus,
are more capable of interpreting certain policies that are governed
by English law. Comparatively, New York has very little
connection to the New Hampshire case, except for the domicile of
the lead underwriter. There is also a general presumption in U.S.
courts stating that cases brought by foreign plaintiffs are less
convenient compared to those brought by domestic plaintiffs.92
If the Construction Companies sued the Insurers in Germany
(see Box D in Table 1), would the German courts grant the
Insurers' request to decline jurisdiction on the basis of forum non
conveniens or a similar notion? The answer is no,: even if the
German courts recognize the forum non conveniens doctrine
under the traditional German conflict of laws rules. It is well-
settled that there is no room under the Judgment Regulation for a
court in a member state to decline jurisdiction when jurisdiction
arises thereunder." Similarly, an English court could not enjoin
the defendants from pursuing a lawsuit in Germany because of the
anti-suit injunction in this case,94 no matter how unreasonable the
assumption of jurisdiction.
In summary, due to the potential application of the forum non
conveniens doctrine, the Construction Companies are probably
unable to sue in New York, though they could choose to sue in
London or Germany. Bringing suit in London or Germany seems
like the most reasonable choice in light of the few ties to New
York and the availability of a much more appropriate forum in
England.
91. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508 (1947).
92. See Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 255-56 (1981).
93. Case C-412/98, Group Josi Reinsurance Co. S.A. v. Universal Gen. Ins. Co., 2000
E.C.R. 1-05925, 1-05933.
94. See Case C-159/02, Turner v. Grovit, 2004 E.C.R. 1-3565, 1-3576.
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B. Jurisdiction Agreement and Arbitration Agreement
Although it is extremely difficult to enforce a jurisdiction
agreement against a policyholder under the Judgment Regulation,
U.S. courts will usually give a jurisdiction agreement effect unless
it is affected by "fratid, undue influence, or overweening
bargaining power." 5 It is also believed that, "in practice[,] clauses
are rarely denied enforcement on this ground."9 6 In the New
Hampshire case, assuming there is a jurisdiction agreement
granting exclusive jurisdiction to the English courts, U.S. courts
would likely give effect to the jurisdiction agreement, given the
equal bargaining power between the parties and the excellent
reputation of the English courts on insurance matters. The U.S.
courts will also generally enforce arbitration agreements. In fact, it
is more difficult to oust an arbitration agreement than a
jurisdiction agreement, because U.S. courts will only deny
enforcement of such agreements if "the fraud or duress [is] specific
to the clause." 97
C. What if the New Hampshire Case Happened in
the United States?
When analyzing the New Hampshire case, it appears that the
U.S. rules are much more reasonable and likely to provide a more
satisfactory result. However, what if we reverse the facts of the
New Hampshire case? In our hypothetical New Hampshire case
(the "New Hampshire case II"), we will assume that the Insurers
are from England and entered into an insurance policy with the
Construction Companies, located in California. The insurance
policy was negotiated and concluded in Texas by the Insurers'
Texas representative. and the Construction Companies' Texas
insurance brokers. In our hypothetical, the insured risks of the
insurance policy continue to be in Iraq. The analysis of our
hypothetical is summarized in Table 2 below:
95. M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 12 (1972).
96. SCOLESETAL., supra note 79, at 471.
97. Id. (citing Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 519 n.14 (1974)).
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Table 2 - Jurisdictional Analysis of New Hampshire Case H
Plaintiff English Insurers California
Court with suing California Construction
Jurisdiction Construction Companies suing
Companies English Insurers
Texas (playing the A B
role of England)
England (playing the C D
role of New York) X 4
California (playing E F
the role of England) X X
At first glance, the situation is the same as McGee if the
California Construction Companies filed a lawsuit against the
English Insurers for non-payment in California. After all, the
Supreme Court in McGee held that the plaintiff was entitled to a
claim for non-payment in California against the Texas insurer,
even if the Texas insurer had only tenuous contact with California,
including the sale of a single insurance policy.98 Thus, like the New
Hampshire case, the insured is allowed to sue the foreign insurer
in the state where the insured is domiciled.
However, it is argued that the Supreme Court never laid
down any rigid categorical rule as did the EU. While it is true that
the Supreme Court in McGee held that the California Court had
jurisdiction, this was mainly because of the Texas insurer's
intentional effort to sell in California.9 In the New Hampshire case
II, the English Insurers do not make any effort to sell in California,
and their representative and the Construction Companies' Texas
insurance brokers conclude the insurance policy in Texas.
Consequently, the English Insurers have no minimum contacts
with California that would justify the California Court's
assumption of jurisdiction (see Box F in Table 2). This view is
supported by Hanson v. Denckla, a Supreme Court case that was
decided less than one year after McGee. 0
In Hanson, the Supreme Court further established the
standard of "purposeful availment."101 According to the Supreme
98. McGee v. Int'l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220,223 (1957).
99. Id.
100. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
101. Id at 253.
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Court, "it is essential in each case that there be some act by which
the defendant purposefully avails, itself of the privilege of
conducting activities within the forum state, thus invoking the
benefits and protections of its laws."102 This approach has been
adopted by subsequent state court cases. For example, in Malone
v. Eqitas Reinsurance Ltd., the insured, who was from California,
obtained a stop-loss policy to cover business risks in England,
which an incorporated association of English insurance
underwriters (the "Association") underwrote. The insured brought
a suit against the Association and the English underwriter in
California. The insured alleged that the Association and the
English underwriter were obligated under the plan to provide
coverage under the policy.'o3 The California Court of Appeal
noted that McGee did not hold that "the simple fact that
beneficiaries of an insurance policy issued by a foreign corporation
reside in California is sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction
over that corporation."' 04 Accordingly, by simply obtaining
insurance to cover business risks in England from their English
agents, the correspondence from London to California, for
example, making some payments under the policy and denying
others, does not constitute sufficient minimum contacts in
California, as is required under McGee.
' Another distinction between McGee and the New Hampshire
case II is the bargaining power of the plaintiffs. Unlike the
powerful corporate Construction Companies, the plaintiff in
McGee is a private individual."' In McGee, the Supreme Court
expressed concern that requiring the plaintiff to travel to Texas for
the lawsuit would essentially deprive her of the opportunity to sue
the insurer."o' However, this does not mean that U.S. courts will
blindly protect policyholders as does the Judgment Regulation.
In Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, the Supreme Court held
in favor of the financially more powerful Florida franchisor in its
lawsuit against the Michigan franchisee, and decided that the
102. Id.
103. Malone v. Equitas Reinsurance Ltd., 101 Cal. Rptr. 2d 524, 526-27 (Cal. App.
Dep't Super. Ct. 2000).
104. Id. at 530; see also Tri-West Ins. Servs., Inc. v. Seguros Monterrey Aetna, S.A., 78
Cal. App. 4th 672, 677 (Cal. Ct: App. 2000).
105. See McGee v. Int'l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
106. Id. at 223.
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Florida courts did not have jurisdiction.0 7 Refusing to categorize
the case simply according to the financial strength of the parties,
the Supreme Court reached a decision after it concluded that the
franchisee had purposefully availed itself in Florida, establishing
sufficient minimum contacts to be subject to jurisdiction in the
Florida courts.08 In particular, the Supreme Court expressly
rejected the notion that "an individual's contract with an out-of-
state party alone can automatically establish sufficient minimum
contacts in the other party's home forum." 109
Applying the rules above, the only state in which the
California Construction Companies could sue the English Insurers
in the New Hampshire case II is Texas, where the transaction has
more contacts therein (see Box A in Table 2). Similarly, if the
English Insurers sought a declaratory judgment in Texas, the
California Construction Companies would likely be subject to
jurisdiction in the Texas courts, because their Texas insurance
brokers solicited the insurance coverage (see Box B in Table 2).
The purposeful availment requirement would likely be satisfied as
well. This result is desirable because there appears to be no reason
why the jurisdiction rules should reach a different result in cases
initiated by the California Construction Companies rather than the
English Insurers.
The only unsatisfactory result is that the California
Construction Companies will be able to sue the English Insurers in
the English courts under the Judgment Regulation (see Box D.in
Table 2). However, this has nothing to do with the U.S.
jurisdictional rules. It should also be noted that the Judgment
Regulation will not apply to cases where the English Insurers try
to sue the California Construction Companies in England (see Box
C of Table 2), because the California Construction Companies are
not domiciled in a EU member state. Thus, the case would be
outside the scope of the Judgment Regulation. If we apply the
traditional jurisdictional rules of England instead, it is' unlikely that
the English courts will assume jurisdiction in the case.
It may be argued that the given facts of the New Hampshire
case II are too one-sided, leaning towards a particular jurisdiction.
What if the English Insurers' representative negotiated the
107. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 487 (1985).
108. Id. at 479-80.
109. Id. at 478.
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insurance policy in both Texas and California? If the English
Insurers' representative negotiated the insurance policy in both
Texas and California, minimum contacts could be established in
both Texas and California. This would then give the California
Construction Companies the opportunity to "shop" between the
jurisdictions. However, jurisdiction rules are not the only
mechanism for the U.S. courts to manage proper allocation of
jurisdiction. As mentioned above, the forum non conveniens
doctrine allows U.S. courts in different states to defer to a more
appropriate forum in another state."o This is true even if a court
has found minimum contacts in its own state."' Consequently,
where it is possible for the plaintiff to file suit in more than one
state, its counsel must assess the chance of the case being declined
by courts based on forum non conveniens. Furthermore, the
parties could have prevented the jurisdictional dispute by
including a jurisdiction clause or an arbitration agreement.11
The application of the New Hampshire case and the New
Hampshire case II to the jurisdictional approaches of the
Judgment Regulation and the U.S. are summarized in Table 3
below:
Table 3 - Summary of the New Hampshire Case and
New Hampshire Case II
Insurance
Companies
suing
Construction
companies
New Hampshire Case
English courts have no
jurisdiction. New York
courts have no basis to
assume jurisdiction.
Only German courts can
assume jurisdiction.
New Hampshire Case H
Texas courts, playing the
role of English court,
will exercise jurisdiction.
California courts,
playing the role of
German courts, will
likely decline
jurisdiction. English
courts, playing the role
of New York courts, will
not assume jurisdiction.
110. SCOLES ET AL., supra note 79, at 479-80.
111. CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3828 (3d ed. 2009).
112. Id. § 1064.
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Construction May shop between Texas courts, playing the
companies German and English role of English court,
suing courts. May potentially will exercise jurisdiction.
Insurance sue in the New York California courts,
Companies courts by general playing the role of
jurisdiction, but likely to German courts,.will not
be declined due to forum have jurisdiction.
non conveniens. English courts, playing
the role of New York
courts, will have
jurisdiction.
IV. CRITICISMS
A. The Rigidness of the Judgment Regulation
While the U.S. jurisdiction rules are not perfect, they have
three significant mechanisms that ensure proper allocation of
jurisdiction: (1) flexible jurisdiction rules, (2) the availability of
forum non conveniens, and (3) the general enforcement of
jurisdiction agreements."' By limiting the options available to the
plaintiff, whether the plaintiff is the Construction Companies or
the Insurers, to only those that are reasonable, U.S. jurisdictional
rules help prevent forum shopping. Comparatively, the Judgment
Regulation's rules are much more rigid. By eliminating the forum
non conveniens doctrine and substantially limiting the effect of the
jurisdiction clause for insurance companies, it is more likely to lead
to absurd results and promote forum shopping. In addition,
although U.S. courts protect weaker parties in appropriate
situations, the do not blindly protect them as their counterparts
do in the EU. 14 Ultimately, the U.S. jurisdictional rules are more
likely to achieve the goal of protecting policyholders who deserve
such protection than the Judgment Regulation.
Comparing the Judgment Regulation and U.S. jurisdictional
rules could be viewed as a classic "rule versus standard" choice.
The Judgment Regulation is rule-based. In most circumstances, it
is clear which court is going to assume jurisdiction. Moreover, the,
113. Id. § 3828.
114. See Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. at 462.
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discretion of the court is kept to a minimum in order to reach the
same result in all member states. Thus, it could be argued that this
system has the advantage of being more predictable. On the other
hand, the U.S. jurisdictional rules are standard-based. Before
deciding whether a court in the U.S. will have jurisdiction over a
defendant, the plaintiff's . counsel must conduct a minimum
contacts analysis of the defendant, which may not be as clear as
merely deciding the domicile of the defendant. However, it is
submitted that the U.S. jurisdictional rules are more flexible and
more likely to produce a just result in a given case."'
As we have seen throughout this article, the rule-based
Judgment Regulation is more prone to producing absurd situations
where litigants could find themselves in a court they never
expected. While standards might not always be better than rules,
standards usually fit better with jurisdictional matters. If we look
at the practice of international commerce, it is no coincidence that
New York law and English law are always preferred."' Apart from
the fairness and commercial savvies of substantive law, fair conflict
of law rules also play a big part. Since the ability of the parties to
litigate in an appropriate forum has a significant weight in the final
decision, it is worthwhile to take the extra mile to reach a fair
decision in each individual case rather than settling for a simple
and predictable forum.
That being said, the EU was subject to more limitations than
the U.S. when building up their jurisdictional rules. Although the
U.S. consists of fifty different states, the legal systems among them
are rather similar. The same cannot be said of the EU because
each member state has had its own unique and long standing legal
system for hundreds of years. In order to harmonize the Judgment
Regulation's jurisdictional rules as an effort to facilitate the
integration of the EU, it is understandable that the Judgment
Regulation's drafters preferred a more heavy-handed -approach
that eliminated the discretion of the courts in each member state
and achieved a more standardized result. However, while this is a
reasonable justification, it may be an unsatisfactory explanation
115. Christopher W. Meyer, World Wide Advertising: Personal Jurisdiction Around the
Whole Wide World?, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1269, 1271 (1997).
116. Traditional English conflict of laws, which are much closer to the U.S. rules,.are
still applicable in cases where the defendant is not domiciled in a member state. In other
words, the Judgment Regulation is not applicable in those cases.
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for litigants who are forced to litigate their disputes in
inappropriate fora.
B. Unfairness Experienced by the Insurance Companies
By looking more closely at the Judgment Regulation's
application in insurance matters, it becomes obvious that the
Judgment Regulation is not fair to the insurance companies. The
problem of rigidity that is mentioned above is intensified when the
rules are so one-sided that they favor the policyholders
indistinctively. It gives the policyholders too many options to
forum shop, while limiting insurance companies to litigating at the
home jurisdiction of the policyholders. In addition, the Judgment
Regulation practically eliminates the discretion courts have in
preventing potential injustice." While the rule-based system might
be justified in the EU, the specific rules here are simply flawed,.
particularly their failure to take into account the unfair advantages
gained by sophisticated policyholders. As mentioned above, the
Judgment Regulation protects the policyholder, insured, and
beneficiary, without looking beyond the labels."8 This is not fair
treatment to the insurance companies, which deal with these
powerful policyholders on an arms-length basis.
We can also look at this unfairness from an economic
perspective. According to Richard Posner, the goal of the
jurisdictional rules is to allocate the dispute to the forum in which
the combined cost of the parties will be the lowest."' By
"subsidizing" the parties who do not deserve the protection, the
equilibrium is disturbed and the total cost of the litigation will
likely increase. Here, the cost is not limited to the combined cost
of the parties and includes the cost to the legal system. In the New
Hampshire case, for example, it is easy to imagine that both the
litigants and the German court will have to take extra steps to
collect evidence and interview witnesses in London. In addition,
the German court will likely have to apply English law to
adjudicate the matter. Thus, an inefficient rule will likely lead to
social waste.
117. Council Regulation 44/2001, supra note 3, art. 9.
118. Id. art. 9.
119. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW Ch. 1 (6th ed. 2003).
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C. Unfairness Against Foreign Insurance Companies Under the
European Rules
If rules are unfair to an industry in general, they are more
unfair to foreign insurance companies. The analysis above
demonstrates the unreasonableness of deeming the U.S. insurance
companies as being domiciled in England under Article 9(2). If the
EU applied the minimum contacts test to the New Hampshire
case, it could easily conclude that the English courts could acquire
jurisdiction over the U.S. insurance company on the basis that it
conducted business in London through a branch office. In this
regard, it is not unreasonable to deem the U.S. insurance company
as domiciled in England. However, the most significant impact of
deeming the U.S. insurance company as domiciled in England is
making the U.S. insurance company fall under the tenets of the
Judgment Regulation regime. This will make the Article 9(1)(b)
rule applicable to them, for example, making it possible for the
plaintiff to sue from its home court, a German court in this case, as
well. As many U.S. insurance companies have a branch, agency, or
establishment in London, they will always be deemed domiciled
there as far as their European operations are concerned.
Therefore, if a U.S. insurance company does more than transact
through a representative, it potentially has two domiciles, one in
London and the other in the U.S.
In addition, unlike insurance companies based in the EU,
U.S. insurance companies usually have smaller operations in
Europe. If both EU insurance companies and U.S. insurance
companies are regarded as domiciled in the EU, it would be much
more costly for U.S. insurance companies to defend themselves in
the EU. If this increased cost is to be reflected in higher premiums
by U.S. insurance companies, the effect would be to impose a tariff
on the import of insurance products from the U.S. This situation is
unfair to foreign insurance companies.'20 Comparatively, there is
no distinction between the application of the jurisdictional rules
over a domestic insurance company and a foreign insurance
company per se under U.S. jurisdictional rules. The only test to be
120. Unfairness also occurs when U.S. insurance companies do not have a branch in
Europe. Since they would not be regarded as domiciled in Europe, the Judgment
Regulation would not apply. However, a European policyholder could use all exorbitant
jurisdiction bases, which are prohibited for use against an entity of a member state and
against a U.S. insurance company.
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considered is whether the insurance company in question, whether
foreign or in the U.S., has established the minimum contacts in a
given state so that it will be fair for that state to exercise
jurisdiction.
D. Unfair Protection of European Policyholders, Insureds, and
Beneficiaries
On the other side of the coin, the protection of the Judgment
Regulation is discriminatory against a foreign policyholder,
insured, and beneficiary that purchases an insurance policy from a
EU insurance company. Since these foreign policyholders are not
domiciled in the EU, the Judgment Regulation's protections are
not applicablel2' no matter how much they deserve protection.
Comparatively, there is no special protection available for a
domestic policyholder, insured, or beneficiary per se in the U.S.
While there are special statutes that allow the state insurance
commissioner to be deemed the insurer's attorney for service of
process for non-admitted, foreign insurance companies, these
statutes do not constitute a basis for exercising jurisdiction.12
Independent jurisdictional ground must be found over the foreign
parties in order to satisfy due process.'23 Therefore, the protections
that are solely available to EU policyholders are another form of
tax imposed on foreign purchasers.
V. RECOMMENDATIONS
The term "forum shopping" might have carried a bad name
over the years. After all, the famous Erie case was said to be an
attempt by the Supreme Court to prevent forum shopping.12 4
Nevertheless, forum shopping is a reality. As long as there are
differing jurisdictional rules, counsel for parties in litigation will
continue to explore the best possible forum for their clients. From
the perspective of the courts, forum shopping may not be wholly
negative. Lord Denning, probably the most famous and influential
121. The jurisdictional rules of the respective European Union member state will apply
in this case.
122. Tri-West Ins. Servs., 78 Cal. App. 4th at 676 (discussing the effect of the California
Insurance Code).
123. Id. at 676-77.
124. Hamilton v. Roth, 624 F.2d 1204, 1214 (3d Cir. 1980); Edelson v. Soricelli, 610
F.2d 131, 135 (3d Cir. 1979).
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judge in England over the last century, once said in The Atlantic
Star: "You may call this 'forum-shopping' if you please, but if the
forum is England, it is a good place to shop in, both for the quality
of goods and the speed of service."125 While U.S. judges might not
have explicitly echoed this statement, it can be seen from various
cases that U.S. judges are always confident that- their courts will
reach a just outcome. The rather broad jurisdictional bases in the
U.S.tates reflect this belief. In fact, New York law and English law
remain the most popular choices as the governing law in
international transactions. 126 This could be attributed to the
practicality and commercial savvies of the bodies of laws
themselves, as well as the general expectation that both U.S. and
English courts will do a good job of adjudicating any disputes that
may arise.
However, the emphasis here is not to debate whether forum
shopping is good or bad. The real problem with forum shopping in
Anglo-American insurance litigation is the lack of equivalent
jurisdictional rules in the EU between insurance companies on one
side and policyholders, insureds, and beneficiaries on the other
side. The U.S. jurisdictional rules, despite their opt-criticized
broad applicability, give both sides a level playing field. While
actual applicability might still lead to the imposition of
jurisdictions that might not be the most appropriate in difficult
cases involving ties with multiple jurisdictions, the rules seek a fair
and just outcome. In contrast, there exists a wholesale unfairness
in cases where sophisticated policyholders manage to take
advantage of loopholes in the Judgment Regulation at the expense
of insurance companies. As mentioned above, the insertion of
arbitration clauses could partially mitigate this potential
unfavorable effect of the Judgment Regulation, but the situation is
not close to ideal. Instead, this article recommends a number of
ways that the Judgment Regulation could be improved. The
recommendations are set forth below from the most ideal to the
most practical.
125. The Atlantic Star, [1973] 1 Q.B. 364,382 (U.K.).
126. Matthias Lehmann, Liberating the Individual from Battles Between States:
Justifying Party Autonomy in Conflict of Laws, 41 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 381, 393-94
(2008).
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A. Forum Non Conveniens
The doctrine of forum non conveniens gives maximum
flexibility to the courts of the member states to look into the entire
circumstances surrounding a case in order to determine whether
they should assume jurisdiction. For example, in the New
Hampshire case, when German construction companies attempted
to bring litigation in the German courts, the German courts would
have been able to balance their interest in protecting the German
parties against litigating in London, a more convenient forum. The
insurance companies could present evidence that the German
policyholders were sophisticated parties and intended to grant
English courts jurisdiction in the first place.127 In the end, the
German courts might still have decided to protect their own
corporations, but the doctrine at least allows the insurance
companies to present their case. In effect, this makes the
protection of the policyholders a presumption, allowing the courts
to exercise discretion in order to find a more appropriate forum
for special cases.
B. Limiting the Application of Section 3
It may be difficult for the Judgment Regulation to bring in a
wholesale change in forum non conveniens. A more practical
approach is to amend Section 3 to limit the applicability to the
"private insured" that deserve legitimate protection under the
Judgment Regulation. This type of reform has been performed
under Section 4 of the Judgment Regulation, which. governs the
128jurisdictional rules of consumer contracts. Previously, this
section provided certain protections regarding "matters relating to
the sale of goods on installment [sic] credit terms," 29 but it was not
clear who would be entitled to the protections.
In Socigtg Bertrand v. Paul Ott KG, the European Court of
Justice rejected the argument that a sale of machine tools by one
company to another, with payment to be made by two bills of
exchange at sixty and ninety days, falls into the scope of Section
4.30 It held that this section was originally intended to entail the
127. See New Hampshire Ins. Co. v. Strabag Bau A.G., [1992] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 361, 371
(U.K.).
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Case 150177, Bertrand v. Paul Ott KG, 1978 E.C.R. 1431, 1$ 7,22.
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restriction of the jurisdictional advantage to buyers who are in
need of protection."' These buyers were considered to occupy
weaker economic positions than the sellers due to the fact that
they are private consumers and are not engaged when buying the
product acquired on installment credit terms, in trade, or
professional activities.132 Shortly after the decision, this section was
amended and clarified in order to show that it only applies to
buyers who might broadly be classified as consumers. In the New
Hampshire case, counsel for the Insurers tried to use Section 4 in
order to persuade the Court of Appeal to interpret Section 3 to
cover only "private policyholders," but the argument was
rejected.m' However, despite subsequent cases from the European
Court of Justice repeatedly stating that the original intention of
Section 3 was to protect weaker parties, the Court continued to
ignore the specific issue of the sophisticated policyholders.
With regard to such a clear statement and the Court's
experience with consumer contracts, it seems obvious that the
European Court of Justice should carry out such an intention and
exclude not only professional insurance parties from the
protections, but also those sophisticated policyholders who do not
deserve such protections. It just takes one more step for a court
and the EU to face the reality and limit the application of such
protections to those who deserve them.
C. Clarifying the "Large Risks" Exception
As outlined above, the parties may opt out of the Judgment
Regulation when the insurance policy in question deals with large
risks. However, the large risks exception is still limited and
unclear. From a structural point of view, clarifying the exception
should be easy. The exception is already specified in subsequent
Council Directives of the EU and the extension thereof does not
require an amendment to the Judgment Regulation itself. In
particular, the kind of limitation envisioned has alreadr been
included in the current Council Directive for financial loss.' What
the EU needs to do is to clarify the definition of financial loss and
131. Id. 1 21.
132. Id.
133. New Hampshire Ins. Co., [1992] 1 Lloyd's Rep. at 367-68.
134. Council Directive 73/239/EEC, supra note 61.
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to apply a general exception to all insurance policies entered into
by sophisticated policyholders.
Although there is a debate as to what should be the right
threshold for sophisticated policyholders (and the current one
appears to be too high), it is a step in the right direction. This
reform in the jurisdictional rules might not be as complete as the
previous two suggestions, but it should help alleviate the problem
substantially. The net effect of the change will be to encourage
insurance companies to negotiate a jurisdiction clause with
sophisticated policyholders, a task both parties should be able to
achieve considering the consequence of not having such a clause.
Meanwhile, cases involving weak policyholders, insureds, and
beneficiaries will continue to be protected by the Judgment
Regulation.
D. What if the European Union Decides to Make No Change at
All?
If the EU decides to make no change to its current
jurisdictional rules, the U.S. courts and government should not
change its current jurisdictional rules in order to force a change on
the EU's side. As demonstrated above, the U.S. rules manage to
achieve consistent and fair results in most cases. In addition, in
order to continue the popularity of U.S. law in international
commerce, the preservation of the current system is essential.
Finally, the U.S. Supreme Court has taken the view that U.S.
commerce abroad would be hampered if its courts did not adopt
an internationalist approach."' By enforcing the jurisdictional
clause granting exclusive jurisdiction to England in favor of the
German party and not the U.S. party, the U.S. Supreme Court
stated in MIS Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co. that "[t]he
expansion of American business and industry will hardly be
encouraged if, notwithstanding solemn contracts, we insist on a
parochial concept that all disputes must be resolved under our
laws and in our courts."136 Therefore, U.S. courts should not
retaliate by imposing unreasonable jurisdictional rules on
European insurance companies.
135. LAWRENCE COLLINS, ESSAYS IN INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION AND THE
CONFLICT OF LAWS 267 (1994).
136. M/S Breman v. Zapata Offshore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 9 (1972).
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